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Beirut: Amal, 7, carries a poster of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah among the rubble in Dahiya, the southern district of Beirut.

Knudsen & Kerr (eds) LEBANON *After the Cedar Revolution* HURST

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LEBANON

After the Cedar Revolution

Foreword by Augustus Richard Norton



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9

THE MAKING OF A MARTYR

FORGING RAFIK HARIRI'S SYMBOLIC LEGACY

Ward Vloeberghs

Introduction

In the late 1970s, at the age of thirty-five, Rafik Hariri acquired his first private aeroplane.[1] Twenty years later, he owned a Boeing fleet that inspired awe in wealth watchers, plane spotters, and beyond. Whether as a businessman or a politician, extraordinary accomplishments were a recurrent feature of Hariri's remarkable life. Even his death and the period following it are beset by spectacular events, some of which make up Hariri's legacy and form the starting point for this chapter, which will analyse how Hariri's legacy as a statesman and as an entrepreneur has been magnified after his death. It explores the various techniques, strategies and instruments deployed in the myth-making process that surrounded the commemoration of Hariri during the months following his assassination by a massive car bomb on 14 February 2005.

With hindsight, Hariri's dramatic death heralded a new chapter in Lebanon's history. The political turbulence triggered by his abrupt disappearance contributed to the eruption of a devastating war between Hizbollah and Israel on 12 July 2006. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the

glorification of Hariri started only in 2005. Though that date marks the beginning of a transformative period in Lebanese political history, the starting point of the idolisation of Hariri goes back much further, since his reputation had been firmly established by the time he first became prime minister in 1992.

This chapter examines the local political context of Hariri's nascent 'martyrdom' as well as the international ramifications of his assassination before arguing that significant efforts have been made to keep Hariri's legacy at the heart of Lebanese political life. The dynamics that contribute to establishing Hariri's symbolic legacy as a martyr are fourfold and entail processes of appropriation, negotiation, contestation and confirmation. Finally, this chapter will illustrate how these efforts related to Hariri's political programme and link up with the predicament of his successors.

The Birth of a Martyr

One of the key components of Hariri's legacy is his proclaimed 'martyrdom'. While martyrs, especially politically styled martyrs, are not uncommon in Lebanon, their appearance in the public realm is nonetheless a complex phenomenon. Indeed, the concept of martyrdom is recurrent and well established in Lebanese politics, either through political assassination (very few of which have, in fact, been successfully investigated) or through the religious concept of martyrdom that is deeply embedded, and indeed cultivated, by Christian and Muslim Lebanese alike.[2] Yet, in spite of the ubiquity of martyrs, the political use of martyrs in public discourse is far from uniform or straightforward.

As far as Hariri is concerned, his political commemoration was established gradually, through a combination of remarkable societal change, political manoeuvring and historic events. As Volk has suggested, 'martyrs live on in the memory of subsequent generations not only as a "lesson" but also as a profound reassurance of group survival against the odds. It is the specific circumstances that led up to the martyrs' death, the tragedy preceding the dying, that make for a narrative worth (re)telling'.[3]

In Hariri's case, his legacy was given a decisive orientation by the events that dominated the Lebanese political scene immediately after his assassination. The month that followed his untimely death became a constitutive element in Hariri's 'martyrdom' and it marks the public birth and consecration of Hariri as a 'national hero' on Martyrs' Square, between 14 February

and 14 March 2005.[4] This succession of unprecedented events in which Lebanese of various confessional backgrounds converged on the central squares of the capital, has been labelled the 'Cedar Revolution', 'Beirut spring' or 'independence Intifada' and represents a critical juncture in Lebanese political history.[5]

According to Volk, 'martyrs became national symbols because they *did not* give up their ethno-religious affiliation; instead, they died and were commemorated as members of their communities who gave the ultimate sacrifice together with members from others'.[6] The explosion that cost Hariri his life also killed more than twenty other Muslims and Christian citizens, some of whom were accompanying his motorcade (such as his bodyguards and his close aide Basil Fuleihan, the former minister of economy) and others who were just bystanders.

Hariri's 'martyrdom' was reinforced by three events that had far-reaching consequences for Lebanon—Hariri's funeral, the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Hariri's funeral on 16 February in which hundreds of thousands participated, produced sensational scenes of popular grief as well as anger at the regime of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud (1998–2007) whom the Hariri family declared *persona non grata* at the ceremony. By contrast, French President Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) and his wife flew in later that day and appeared with Hariri's widow at the freshly arranged gravesite.

Riding on the momentum this created, considerable numbers of young Beirutis launched a sit-in in front of the Martyrs' Statue on 18 February, both in homage to Hariri and in defiance of the government's orders banning demonstrations. Day after day, the protests grew more politicised and anti-Syrian slogans proliferated. It became clear that Hariri's assassination was being exploited by several political actors, including members of the so-called Bristol Gathering.[7]

On 21 February 2005, US President George W. Bush and Chirac released a joint declaration calling on Syria to leave Lebanon and two days later Druze leader Walid Jumblatt revealed details of threatening remarks apparently made by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Hariri prior to his death.[8] It is in this context that, on 24 February, the Irish policeman Peter FitzGerald arrived in Beirut to head a preliminary UN investigation which was then followed by the United Nations Independent International Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) and, in turn, the establishment of the STL.

Meanwhile, the opposition called for a general strike and on 28 February 2005 thousands of protesters ignored government instructions prohibiting

popular meetings by flocking onto the Martyrs' Square, which they renamed *sahat al-hurriya* (Freedom Square). This culminated into a second apex and the biggest victory so far for the demonstrators when Prime Minister Karami, who had succeeded Hariri as premier in October 2004, was forced to resign. The third defining historic moment came only a few days later, on 5 March, when President Bashar al-Assad announced a two-phased withdrawal of Syrian troops.

In response to the political escalation at the Martyrs' Square and to clarify its own stance, Hizbollah called for a demonstration to be held on 8 March, the anniversary of the Baath Party's coming to power in Syria in 1963. The demonstration sported no party imagery, carrying only national Lebanese flags. Half a million people gathered on Riad al-Solh Square, next to the Martyrs' Square, carrying portraits of Assad to express their gratitude for helping to bring stability to Lebanon during the past twenty-nine years.[9] Participants heard Hizbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah denounce American interference and criticise Resolution 1559 as Israeli-inspired.[10] It was the first important and most visible testimony since Hariri's death that the Lebanese were not uniformly supportive of the anti-Syrian discourse.

In response, the Bristol Gathering staged a trans-communitarian mobilisation in reply to Hizbollah's demonstration of popular, mainly Shia support. On Monday 14 March 2005, Lebanon witnessed the largest public rally in its history. It has been claimed that one out of every four Lebanese answered the appeal to participate in a gathering that left a profound impression on millions of people's collective memory.[11] Cheering crowds chanted *hurriya-siyada-istiqlal* (Liberty, Sovereignty, Independence) or *haqiqa, hurriya, wihda wataniya* (Truth, Liberty, National Unity), thus contributing to startling scenes of euphoric nationalism. It is worth recalling, however, that although it has been portrayed as the expression of accumulated anger, the 14 March demonstrations were first and foremost a reaction to what had happened a week earlier for without 8 March there would have been no 14 March.

National or International Martyr?

As shown, Hariri's assassination generated an unprecedented outcry among Lebanese Sunnis who rallied against Syria. Thus, the maelstrom of events had transformed Rafik Hariri—who was increasingly being referred to as

ar-ra'is ash-shahid, the martyr president—from a moderate Sunni politician into a Lebanese 'martyr', celebrated for his contribution to the liberation from Syrian occupation. For most of his career, however, Hariri had been a pragmatic Lebanese politician who understood the strategic importance of compromise with Syria, as his numerous friendships in and visits to Damascus illustrate. However, Hariri's assassination was soon to generate a feeling of communitarian solidarity among Lebanese Sunnis who felt collectively threatened. This 'deepened sense of sectarian persecution' led to a reconfiguration of the local as well as the regional political landscape.[12]

Secondly, if Hariri's career was marked by a sense of the spectacular, his fondness of the big, bigger, biggest is apparent even in the way he died and the repercussions his death triggered. In effect, an international enquiry and subsequently a special tribunal were set up under the aegis of the UN to investigate the circumstances and perpetrators of the crime, thereby setting a controversial legal precedent.[13] In a sense, the historic campaign unleashed by Hariri's assassination bears witness to Hariri's pervasive posthumous power. Nonetheless, while every community in Lebanon has its martyr(s), Rafik Hariri's international stature was too big to be ignored.

The weeks of initial euphoria in early 2005 were soon eviscerated by a series of political assassinations that spread fear among the 14 March parliamentarians, who eventually took refuge in the Phoenicia Intercontinental Hotel, ironically just opposite the site where Rafik Hariri was assassinated.[14] Hariri's death also provoked a new struggle for power in Lebanon among regional and international actors.

The political vacuum created by Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was matched by an increasingly acrimonious conflict between two geopolitical axes pitted once more against each other on Lebanese territory.[15] On the one hand, Chirac's diplomats saw Hariri's assassination as an opportunity to reconcile with the US administration following a row over military intervention in Iraq in 2003. The shared resentment towards the Syrian regime aligned both of these Western powers with major Sunni regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt—all of whom joined and supported the 14 March politicians in their battle against the 8 March camp. That coalition itself was, on the other hand, being viewed as a proxy for the ever more assertive Damascus-Tehran axis that featured extensions from Iraq (Muqtada al-Sadr) to Lebanon (Hizbollah) and Palestine (Hamas).

Forging a Martyr's Legacy

These national and international shifts are insufficient, however, to fully explain the significance of Hariri's symbolic legacy as a martyr because they do not inform us about how Hariri's hagiography, carefully crafted around the notion of his 'martyrdom', unfolded. In order to fully illustrate this we must look at various means (understood as resources) and various locations or scenes that participate in moulding and nurturing the exceptional status of Hariri as a modern-day martyr.

The presence of visual, rhetorical and financial means which often hold political and/or religious connotations is a recurrent characteristic in the development of Hariri's symbolic legacy and can be understood by analysing four aspects of his political person: processes of appropriation; instances of negotiation; practices of contestation; and instruments of confirmation.

Processes of Appropriation

One of the key components that fostered these dynamics consisted of physical transformations of the built environment. Some of these spatial modifications contributed to develop what Volk calls a 'memorial'. In Lebanon, Volk contends, 'memorials of Muslim and Christian martyrs successfully, if temporarily, generate attachments to a national community, which is why political elites continued to build them'.[16]

The most obvious memorial to honour Rafik Hariri is his commemorative tomb, known as *darih*, which has been gradually developed into a shrine.[17] Immediately after the assassination of Hariri, his family acquired a plot of land to provide a site for Hariri's final resting place. To accommodate the funerary complex, a spacious white shelter was erected next to the Muhammad al-Amin mosque which Hariri himself had commissioned on Martyrs' Square.

The choice to erect the burial site on this particular location and not, as many expected, in his native town of Sidon, where Hariri had already commissioned two commemorative mosques (one for each of his parents), was part of the family's political strategy to emphasise his sultanesque stature. Crucially, the positioning of Hariri's tomb, which stands on its own, and the graves of his bodyguards, which are lined-up in a separate chamber, was by no means coincidental. Its location complies with aesthetical (in the visual axis of the Martyr's Statue), political (next to the mosque, with access to the square) as well as religious (aligned to Mecca) guidelines. The importance of intervention by the family and the appropriative dimension of its decision can hardly be ignored or overstated and may indeed be an early expression of a will to reconfigure Beirut's emblematic square and the whole of downtown Beirut as a neo-Ottoman assertion of Sunni power through Hariri-related edifices.

One noteworthy evolution has been the steady development of the tomb into an ever more elaborate shrine where activities of remembrance exhibit both political and religious dimensions. It is important to bear in mind that the physical appearance of the *darih* mirrored the prevailing political climate through constant shifts in the political ornamentation surrounding the tomb.

Thus, one could argue that the 'martyr Hariri' underwent a metamorphosis. During the first weeks and months the trans-confessional dimension of Hariri's martyrdom was being stressed and most slogans and images sported visual and verbal references to various religious traditions and the strong Druze and Christian partisanship was illustrated by the participation of Walid Jumblatt, Amine Gemayel and other politicians allied to Hariri. So much so, that Hariri almost became a national hero and a trans-confessional saint, conceptualised here as *Mar Rafiq* (Saint Rafik).[18]

However, as sectarian tensions in Lebanon increased from 2006 onwards, the 'martyr president', as well as his gravesite, rapidly lost their national character and gained distinctive Sunni references and thus became symbols of confessional belonging and partisan power.

The transformation of the gravesite has been operated through numerous and on-going (re)arrangements of ornamentation and glorification items on display around Hariri's tomb. Frequent visits by dignitaries that established the tomb as an important platform from where political speech was launched or through the use of religious paraphernalia (prayer booklets, framed verses, Quranic recitations), the shift clearly went from an inclusive attitude towards a more exclusively Sunni one.

Perhaps the most interesting characteristic in this evolution of the tomb was how it became part of a process of appropriation—defined here as the process of gradually taking possession of something that initially does not formally belong to the actor but who eventually comes to be seen as its owner. This process of making something (material or immaterial) one's own may be accomplished in various ways—physically, legally, symbolically, violently or peacefully.

In the case of Hariri's tomb, this process was quite obvious. Although the plot initially belonged to Solidere[19] and came into the possession of the

Hariri family only after his assassination, the site was transformed almost overnight into a memorial with an international radiance that has, ever since, been developed into a major component of Hariri's martyrdom.[20] It is essential, however, to note that the *darih* does not fulfil this task on its own. In fact, both the tomb and the mosque play that role, which is why they should be understood as jointly constituting Hariri's mausoleum. Both locations are not only being paired visually, the tomb has also been organically connected to the mosque via a direct passage.

The elaborate gravesite is an eloquent illustration of the practices of appropriation that contribute to the shaping of Hariri's symbolic posthumous legacy. The choice of location plays an essential role in strengthening Hariri's dominance over the Beirut city centre. It is no coincidence therefore that, at the ambitious two-day inauguration ceremony of the Muhammad al-Amin mosque in October 2008, his son Saad declared the mosque to be the coronation (*tatwijan*) of his father's reconstruction efforts in Beirut.[21]

Hariri's involvement in the construction of the Muhammad al-Amin mosque can indeed be seen as another process of appropriation, albeit one operated by himself during his lifetime. Plans to construct a major place of worship had been simmering for almost a century and a half. In 1853, the Sunni establishment developed a plot of land offered by the Ottoman sultan into a small prayer hall referred to as *zawiyat Abi Nasr*.[22] Although early plans for a prestigious mosque were cherished by the local community, throughout the decades the project remained a collective dream due to lack of means, competing actors and internal bickering over the tutelage of the *zawiya*. In spite of far-reaching fundraising efforts including Saudi King Faisal and Egyptian President Nasser (then rivals), a decisive commitment and the indispensable finances failed to materialise.

It was only around the turn of the millennium, after decades of delay, that Hariri became publicly involved in the project—reluctantly at first, later as its main protagonist. A convergence of interests with the Mufti of Lebanon produced the breakthrough when Hariri made the construction of the Muhammad al-Amin mosque in *his* reconstructed city centre a priority. Triggered by political competitors in the context of the 2000 elections, Hariri sought to overcome all technical, legal and financial obstacles in his determination to attach his name to the project and to erect the long-awaited place of worship which, at the same time, would increase his religious credentials as a devout, powerful and generous Sunni leader (*zaim*).[23]

Following discussions at his residence in Qoraytem, Hariri secured an agreement with members of the Muhammad al-Amin Association in order to resolve its legal dispute with *Dar al-Fatwa* (the main Sunni authority in Lebanon regarding matters of Islamic law, including properties) and pledged to cover the full costs of the construction.[24] The mosque was completed in 2006. Although Hariri did not live to see its completion, the Muhammad al-Amin mosque became a majestic place of worship, boasting a distinctive silhouette that established the building as an intended benchmark of Islamic architecture in the most symbolically valuable part of Beirut. Because of its longstanding history, its prominent location (on the corner of Martyrs' Square and Emir Bashir Street) and because of the prestige involved the mosque also became a building of (communal as well as personalised) power.

It is possible, therefore, to look at the mosque as an instance of patronage by Hariri to his constituency and as a manoeuvre to sideline Sunni rivals. Not only did Hariri succeed where many others had failed but, by turning the plans for the mosque into a tangible reality, he made a longstanding communal aspiration bear fruit through an act of personal appropriation. With his decisive intervention, Hariri—who had long before started to look for a location in Beirut to erect a monumental mosque—took over the project and transformed the urban environment in a pervasive way that crowned his rise to power in Beirut and in Lebanon as a whole.

Instances of Negotiation

It took four years (2002–6) to construct the Muhammad al-Amin mosque, and this process contributed significantly to the enhancement of Hariri's symbolic legacy in Beirut. These examples have to do with what could be termed 'instances of negotiation'. Negotiation can be understood here as a practice which occurs when actors with different aims, interests or views engage in a formal discussion, or any other form of communication, in their attempts to settle an issue. While negotiations occur in various situations and can take a variety of forms (verbal or not, material or not), this chapter will look at two particular instances of negotiation. The first is architectural with political ramifications, whereas the second pertains to a political ideology which affected the project for the construction of the 'Hariri' mosque, as the Muhammad al-Amin mosque has occasionally (erroneously but tellingly) been named.

First we will consider the complex relationship between the Muhammad al-Amin mosque and the Maronite cathedral of St George, which stands adjacent to the mosque's western facade.[25] Although the mosque has been presented as the symbol of exemplary interfaith coexistence at the time of its inauguration, it is hard to ignore the visual dominance of the mosque over the cathedral. Indeed it seems difficult to deny a confessional connotation to the mosque, since the project originated to counterbalance a gift of land to the Lazarist sisters and since the mosque largely took shape in coordination (or lack thereof, according to some)[26] with the Maronite cathedral.

The mosque's strategic location does not only translate into physical prominence of the Sunni community within the Lebanese capital, it also operates on the symbolic level since the mosque has been said to 'dwarf the cathedral'.[27] So evident has this dominance been that some Christian Lebanese view it as a humiliation, which triggered architectural retaliation by the Maronite clergy in the form of adding a campanile to the St George cathedral that will match the height of the mosque's minarets.

Besides being a prism to analyse inter-communal relations, the construction of the Muhammad al-Amin mosque also represents an important expression of Hariri's religious identity and, thus, a key component of the memorial that enshrines his martyrdom. The very fact that Hariri succeeded in erecting the mosque at that specific location, and to have it built according to this particular scheme with its four minarets and its distinctive neo-Ottoman style, says a great deal about the power he wielded at the time. If this first instance of negotiation highlights a dynamic which intervened partly before and partly after Hariri's death, the second example relates exclusively to Hariri's lifetime.

In as far as architecture can be said to be a concrete expression of a society's opinions and preferences, the construction of the Muhammad al-Amin mosque and the subsequent installation of Hariri's tomb is the most tangible evidence of the defeat of alternative narratives and competing visions of society.

The construction of the mosque with Hariri (and, to a lesser extent the Mufti) as its main commissioners also represents a symbolic victory of Hariri over his opponents at the time. Although at first it may seem somewhat irrelevant for the mosque project, the animosity between Hariri and President Lahoud must be recalled here. In fact, Lahoud encouraged potential opponents of Hariri, such as Salim al-Hoss (a leading Sunni politician, prime minister between December 1998 and October 2000)

and Prince al-Walid bin Talal (an influential Saudi-Lebanese entrepreneur), to get involved in the Muhammad al-Amin project. This contributed to Hariri's decision to take possession of the project according to his own preferences.[28]

Underneath Lahoud's attempts to counter Hariri in his own backyard—the Solidere perimeter—lay deepened antagonisms between two diametrically opposed political projects. The political discourse deployed by Lahoud, a former army chief of staff who had overseen the reconstitution of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), evolved around the necessity to strengthen state institutions. Over time, this insistence on regulation by the Lebanese Republic translated into a systematic beefing-up of the security apparatus, which hampered Hariri and his political allies, as well as his business partners who had set up new or parallel administrative bodies while championing liberalism and mercantile policies in their more lenient approach to bureaucratic rules. Though enforced with Syrian backing, this opposition between Hariri and Lahoud (who supported Hizbollah's resistance project) was essentially the reflection of a recurrent divide in Lebanon, between a 'merchant republic' and a 'militant republic'.[29]

As this cleavage indicates, during part of his premiership, Hariri had to share power with a president opposed to his policies. In the case of the mosque, Hariri emerged victorious once he gained dominant control over the various stakeholders, thus allowing him to increase his visual presence in central Beirut. But as this last instance of negotiation also indicates, Hariri's projects at times generated fierce opposition.

Practices of Contestation

The dynamic of contestation is a third factor central to Hariri's symbolic legacy. Paradoxical as it may seem, such practices of contestation—even though enacted by opponents—eventually contribute to shape and legitimise the hagiography of Rafik Hariri to the same extent as the practices of appropriation and negotiation described above.

Contestation can be understood as an action which formally objects to something, be it tangible or not. A contestation entails an expression of disagreement, a challenging opinion or counter-claim on any given matter, by verbal or by other means. In this case, one form of opposition affects Hariri's mausoleum directly, while another one confronts his legacy from afar. Although the first one is situated after Hariri's death and the second

one started before 2005, both practices of contestation have in common their use of urban space as a political instrument.

The first dynamic of contestation occurred in the wake of the July 2006 war, after Hizbollah and its allies within the 8 March coalition, which includes Michel Aoun's FPM since February 2006, mounted an increasingly harsh opposition campaign against the government led by Fuad Siniora (2005–9). Having blamed the cabinet for its poor handling of the 2006 war and accused some of its members of collaboration with Israeli attempts to crush the 'Islamic resistance in Lebanon' (the military branch of Hizbollah) during the hostilities, 8 March politicians launched a protest on 1 December 2006. They occupied Beirut's central squares and surrounded the *Grand Sérail*, the prime minister's official residence, in a bid to oust Siniora, a protagonist within Hariri's *Tayyar al-Mustaqbal* (Future Movement). The initially cheerful atmosphere of the sit-in had lost most of its vigour by the time the suffocating campaign ended its deadlock of Beirut Central District, some eighteen months later, as part of the Doha Agreement in May 2008.

The Doha Agreement followed a series of security breaches in which armed militants of Hizbollah assisted by gunmen affiliated with other former militias took control of several strategic positions of West Beirut. With remarkable ease, Hizbollah took control of predominantly Sunni neighbourhoods loyal to Hariri's *Mustaqbal*. Other parts of Lebanon (e.g. the Shouf Mountains, Jumblatt's Druze fiefdom) also came under attack from Hizbollah gunmen, with mixed results.[30]

The operations of early May 2008, which came in reaction to a government decision to dismantle parts of a Hizbollah-controlled parallel telecommunications network at the Rafic Hariri International Airport, claimed several lives and traumatised many Lebanese who felt the party had forsaken its promise never to turn its weapons against fellow citizens. Although further escalation was prevented through a much needed high-level reconciliation agreement brokered in Doha, Qatar, the months that followed failed to repair the gap of mistrust between the camps of 8 and 14 March. Most importantly, political disagreement had, at least initially, been expressed through spatial practices.

This evolution is among the more significant shifts to have occurred in Lebanon since Hariri's death. If the 'Independence Intifada' has been a pioneering experience in this respect, the year and a half long sit-in staged by the 8 March coalition in order to further its own political objectives and

obstruct the 14 March agenda has taken this practice of contestation to new heights. The occupation of central urban space as an expression of societal disagreement has thus *de facto* been institutionalised in Lebanon.[31]

What is important here is that the dynamic of contestation instigated by the sit-in impacted on the commemorative space occupied by Hariri's mausoleum. The contestation led to a 'spatialisation of power', whereby urban space becomes an expression of political identity and confessional solidarity. This, in turn, resulted in the reinforcement of the space around the Muhammad al-Amin mosque and Hariri's gravesite as a sector under 14 March control.

This tangible visual and spatial opposition produced spectacular scenes on 14 February 2007, when the throngs of supporters who gathered on the lower part of Martyrs' Square on the occasion of the second annual commemoration of Hariri's assassination were separated by barbed wire from 8 March supporters (mainly Aounists) who had set up their tents on the upper part of the same square.

This spatialisation of political and communal power expressed through urban space is what Haugbolle, when discussing the 2005 events, has termed a 'geography of communitarian divisions'.[32] It is noteworthy that this dynamic, which became clearly visible in central Beirut after 2005, resembles to some extent the 'process of sanctifying sectarian lands', described by Khuri as a characteristic of sects in a multi-confessional context.[33] Furthermore, this spatialisation of power also extends into other neighbourhoods of Beirut, as shown by Harb when she describes the consolidation of a political territory by Hizbollah and Amal in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[34]

The transformations of downtown Beirut through interactions between 'spatial performances and symbolic actions' as described by Haugbolle, were the prelude to a dynamic that continues until today.[35] In fact, political mobilisation has not stopped. On the contrary, over the past few years, the Hariri complex has gradually taken over Beirut Central District by transforming it into a fiefdom.

This stronghold has been systematically fortified through physical interventions which partially echo Hizbollah's urban (re-)arrangements in the southern suburbs but which are at least as much the result of a sustained campaign implemented to pursue the (continuously redefined) battle of the 'martyr president'. While some spatial expressions of Hariri's power may have originated in the dialectics between protestation and reaffirmation, the

same dialectics turned some practices of contestation into instruments of confirmation.

Instruments of Confirmation

This dynamic of confirmation is the fourth and final factor in this analysis of the elements constitutive of Hariri's symbolic legacy. Confirmation—literally to make firm—is understood as the action(s) or indication(s) showing, strengthening or reinforcing something that has been said or decided. The process of confirmation that reinforces Rafik Hariri's visibility is manifold and includes a number of practices—not all of them mutated practices of contestation—which may be seen as attributes of power, developing political significance and territorial exclusivity. It is impossible to cover all of these practices of confirmation, but two major tools of this confirmation process stand out. Though one may think of instruments of confirmation devised during Hariri's lifetime (e.g. his charitable foundation), most of the instruments analysed here were introduced after his assassination.

Apart from the annual 14 February commemorative events[36] and the 2005 renaming of the airport, the first important instrument of confirmation includes the installation of Rafik Hariri statues at two strategic locations in Beirut. The first, in the Ayn al-Mreisseh neighbourhood, stands amidst a roundabout in-between the Phoenicia and the St George hotels. This statue was unveiled on 14 February 2008, at the third annual commemoration of Hariri's assassination. At the same time, about a 100 metres further west, another sculpture was unveiled. Standing in the middle of the road, on the exact location of the assassination, this structure is supposed to light up daily at 12:55, the exact time of the blast that killed Hariri.

A second statue was unveiled on 31 March 2011 in front of the *Grand Sérail*, which Hariri had restored at his own expense. This impressive statue of Hariri now overlooks a multi-level water garden officially called the Hariri Memorial Garden, designed by Vladimir Djurovic who also conceived the award-winning Samir Kassir Square.

This recent evolution, besides being a practice confirming Hariri's personal legacy, is to be inscribed in a local tradition which has seen eminent politicians such as Emir Bashir, Riad al-Solh, Bishara al-Khoury and others honoured as distinguished Lebanese statesmen. However, as the projected Hariri Memorial Library in the vicinity of the mausoleum and the myriad

banners and posters (almost invariably in Lebanese dialect)[37] suggest, this dynamic of installing Hariri-related artefacts is part of a wider tendency that consists of tagging urban space with a political identity. As indicated, these practices occur in relation and reaction to other political actors who engage in similar dynamics elsewhere in Beirut. This leads us to consider the second example of the confirmation dynamic which further explores the links between politics and built fabric.

The focal point of Sunni politics in Beirut is no longer Hariri's palatial residence in Qoraytem. Neither has the torch of symbolic leadership returned to Mussaytbeh, the communal stronghold during the heyday of the Salam family that preceded Hariri's gradual monopolisation of Sunni Beirut.[38] During the past few years, the confessional centre of gravitation has shifted to Centre House in the Beirut Central District where Saad Hariri has taken up residence. The move was not accidental, and underscores Saad Hariri's ambition to fulfil his father's political programme. The shift from Qoraytem to Centre House is therefore a highly important transition and epitomises the installation of what can be termed the 'Hariri dynasty', the emergence of which is among the most significant developments as we reflect on the 2005–12 period.[39]

After he was officially appointed as his father's political successor on 20 April 2005, Saad Hariri also inherited his father's office in Qoraytem, from where he initially operated. Later on, he moved his political and personal headquarters to downtown Beirut. This transfer was preceded by the installation of the state-of-the-art premises of Future News, a sister channel of the Hariri-controlled Future Television network, at the entrance of the Qantari neighbourhood. The television studios, which were attacked in May 2008, are located just opposite the former presidential palace which Hariri also refurbished at his own expense. The transition was further accompanied by the formal relocation of Saad Hariri and his family to Centre House in the Wadi Bou Jamil sector, where his residence is located just below the prime-ministerial offices of the *Grand Sérail* and next to the recently restored Magen Abraham Synagogue (possibly to emphasise Hariri's religious tolerance).

Crucial though these visual markers as practices of confirmation are to perpetuating Hariri's symbolic legacy, the unfolding cult is not limited to the elaboration of a sanctuary devoted to him. Neither is it spatially confined to Martyrs' Square and its surroundings. In fact, the dynamic goes both further geographically and deeper on a structural level. In this respect,

the tribulations of the STL represent an interesting case in the series of events described here.

In fact, the STL is a fine example of how Hariri's legacy can serve as a basis for contestation and confirmation at the same time. While the STL's opponents denounce it as yet another Western interference in Lebanese affairs, the tribunal's supporters defend it as a historic occasion to end impunity. Moreover, the STL is not only a very convenient framework to seek attention for Hariri's legacy on the international public level, it is also a constant reminder of the 'injustice' done to Hariri and his allies. Given Volk's cogent observation that 'martyrs' narratives with their unambiguous assignment of right and wrong, provide their own form of justice and some consolation for mourning communities'[40] it should not be a surprise that the STL and the quest for (an ever more elusive and contested) 'truth' (*haqiqa*) has been at the core of the rhetoric developed around Hariri's martyrdom from 2005 onwards. In fact, every single procedural step in the work of the tribunal has been presented as a vindication of Hariri supporters. Significantly, even the STL was given spatial expressions since calls for 'the truth' appeared on digital counters and billboards throughout Beirut. As such, the STL clearly is an instrument of confirmation.

However, though it was initially an instrument of confirmation, over time, the STL also became a major object of contestation. Because the STL was reportedly targeting Syria, and later implicated members of Hizbollah, it gradually became the centre of controversy between Lebanese politicians and their regional allies. The result, and in contrast to its use in the hands of 14 March politicians, the STL has had a controversial impact on the local (and certainly the regional) level as a consequence of the systematic denunciations of 8 March representatives. The STL thus shows that practices of contestation do not systematically turn into instruments of confirmation but that opposite mutations exists as well and that some examples can actually be an expression of both dynamics.

Overall, the development of the STL as an instrument of confirmation owes much to the impetus of the Hariri family and to the advocacy of Rafik Hariri's political successor. The very appointment of Saad Hariri as political successor and the accompanying political dynasty have perhaps been the most effective ways to pursue Hariri's political project and can thus be seen as a third—or fourth, if we include the STL—instrument of confirmation.

Since he inherited his family's influence and patronage, Saad Hariri has been intensely involved in promoting his own position and his own turf in

Lebanese politics. Having led his coalition to victory in two successive elections (2005, 2009) and enjoying solid international backing, Saad Hariri became prime minister on 9 November 2009. His first official visit to Damascus in late December 2009 indicated a willingness to put national interest ahead of personal grievances but dismayed some of his followers.

However, mounting tensions within Lebanon about the status and the proceedings of the STL started to paralyse Saad Hariri's cabinet before it had completed its first year. On 12 January 2011, just as he was being received by US President Obama, news broke that eleven ministers had submitted their resignation, thus in effect toppling the Hariri-led government. The blow was all the more brutal since the Hizbollah-led opposition designated Tripoli-based Najib Mikati, a Syrian-backed wealthy Sunni politician who had formed an electoral alliance with Hariri in the 2009 elections, as its candidate to form a new cabinet. It looked as if Hariri, with his insistent support for the STL, had been outsmarted by political peers.[41] As the dynastic aspirations of the Hariri family suffered a severe blow, its members prepared for a long battle towards recovery.

Among Hariri's supporters, who denounced Mikati as a traitor, his 'coup' triggered a 'day of anger' with demonstrations degenerating into skirmishes in several Sunni neighbourhoods in Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut on 24 January 2011. A day later however, Saad Hariri, further handicapped by the tiresome cleavage between the 8 and 14 March camps, was confined to watch from abroad as President Michel Sleiman officially appointed Mikati as the prime minister-designate after a parliamentary vote gave the latter a majority of sixty-eight MPs, Walid Jumblatt's bloc having split over the issue.[42] Saad Hariri stayed on as caretaker prime minister until a new cabinet was confirmed by parliament in July 2011. By then, however, parts of the STL's indictment had been released and the political rhetoric had reached new heights.

Conclusion

The period that transformed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (1944–2005) into a 'hero of liberation' and a worshipped 'martyr president' was not static and linear, but rather multi-faceted and heterogeneous. By adopting a technical and practical perspective that focuses on the micro level but does not ignore international ramifications, four key factors which contributed to the development of Hariri's political and symbolic legacy

have been identified. These four dynamics include lifetime as well as posthumous practices of appropriation, negotiation, contestation and confirmation, most often displaying both political and religious characteristics, either of which may be emphasised depending on contextual imperatives.

While the glorification of Hariri had started before his violent death, due to his dramatic assassination his legacy took a decisive turn following the events that prevailed on the Lebanese political scene after February 2005. To start with, processes of appropriation and negotiation led to the installation of a semi-sacred commemorative space entirely dedicated to Hariri in one of Beirut's most prestigious locations. This mausoleum and the cult attached to it evolved considerably over time. Most significantly, his legacy has always been reformulated in interaction with the developments on the local and regional level. Thus, the shift from a national, inclusive memorial into a landmark bearing a more confessional connotation must be seen as an interesting indication that Hariri's legacy reflected a polarisation that was fostered, *inter alia* by the rise and fall of the 14 March coalition, thereby suggesting that it can serve as a useful socio-political prism to analyse Lebanese realities.

The importance of the STL and the meaningful transformations in the city's architectural environment in forging Hariri's political and symbolic legacy, on which his successor capitalises, can hardly be exaggerated. It is indeed crucial to understand the 'spatialisation of communal power' in and around the axis linking Ayn al-Mreisseh—Qantari—Solidere, as well as the gradual reconfiguration of the Martyrs' Square, as instruments confirming Hariri's heritage. Confronted with the slow (and sometimes erratic) proceedings of the STL, Hariri's political heir(s) and allies have not been idly awaiting the court's indictments, but seeking to complete the physical inscription of Hariri's legacy according to their own plans. While this occasionally sparked protests and riots, several of these practices of contestation eventually ended up redefining and reinforcing the objectives of Hariri's 'martyrdom'.

Inevitably, however, the political use of Hariri's legacy leads to ambiguities and contradictions in discourse. As the events of January 2011 and, to a lesser extent, the developments of the 'Arab Spring' have illustrated, Hariri's heritage is neither stable nor clear-cut, but rather a malleable narrative. For example, the political discourse following the ousting of Saad Hariri's cabinet included fear-mongering and the portrayal of Hizbollah as a state-within-the-state. This, in turn, led to Saad Hariri's positioning as a Lebanese

politician defending a strong and democratic state, aiming to contain internal and external threats. That image, however, does not only contradict the political programme of his father who, during much of his years in office, tried to boost parallel bodies, such as the CDR, in order to circumvent bureaucratic obstacles while putting the country back on track. Saad Hariri's 2011 public profile as the guardian of potent state institutions also sounds somehow similar to the political programme of President Lahoud and his acolytes when they were denouncing the clientelist practices and mercantile policies operated by his father, the late Rafik Hariri.

As the Syrian crisis haunting the regime of Bashar al-Assad further polarised the Lebanese and put domestic politics on hold in late 2011–2012, one was left to conclude that transactions between Lebanese merchants and militants rarely result in peaceful prosperity.

92. Harvey, David, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
93. Abdelnour, Ziad, 'The Three Faces of Corruption in Lebanon', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), pp. 6–11.
94. Transparency International's corruption identification.
95. Kriegel, Annie, *Les communistes français*, Paris: le Seuil, 1968.

9. THE MAKING OF A MARTYR: FORGING RAFIK HARIRI'S SYMBOLIC LEGACY

1. Rafik Hariri in an interview with Ghassan Charbel, published by *al-Hayat* between 13 and 17 February 2006. Corm maintains that Hariri's private fleet consisted of at least four Boeings. By comparison, Lebanon's national carrier (MEA) counted only nine planes. Corm, Georges, *Le Liban contemporain. Histoire et société*, Paris: La Découverte, 2005, p. 269. Further details and images of Hariri's aircraft which include B777, B737 and B727 series can be found at specialist websites such as http://www.airliners.net/.
2. The theme of Lebanese martyrs is developed in Volk, Lucia, *Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010; Chaib, Kinda, 'Le Hizbullah libanais à travers ses images: la représentation du martyr', in Mervin, Sabrina (ed.), *Les mondes chiites et l'Iran*, Paris: Karthala, 2007, pp. 113–31; Knudsen, Are, 'Acquiescence to Assassinations in Post-Civil War Lebanon?', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2010), pp. 1–23; Maasri, Zeina, *Off the Wall—Political Posters of the Lebanese Civil War*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009; Schmitt, Paula, *Advertised to Death. Lebanese Poster Boys*, Beirut: Arab Printing Press, 2009.
3. Volk, ibid., p. 31.
4. For an illustrated account that captures the spirit, see for example: Tuéni, Ghassan, and Eli Khoury (eds), *Independence '05: The Beirut Spring*, Beirut: Dar an-Nahar & Quantum Communications, 2005 or Schiller, Norbert, *28 Days that Changed Lebanon 14/02/2005–14/03/2005*, Beirut: Focusmideast, 2006. Tellingly, Saad Hariri often appears with an image of the 'independence intifadah' in the background.
5. Haugbolle, Sune, 'Spatial Transformations in the Lebanese "Independence Intifada"', *The Arab Studies Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2006), pp. 60–77.
6. Volk, ibid., p. 189.
7. After his resignation as prime minister on 20 October 2004, Hariri grew ever closer to the political bloc opposed to the regime of President Lahoud and Syrian interference in Lebanese politics. Though Hariri did not join the group formally, members of his parliamentary bloc attended its meetings in the Bristol Hotel in a private capacity. The gatherings consisted of the mainly Christian politicians of the anti-Syrian Qornet Shehwan alliance as well as Druze politicians (Jumblatt's PSP) but excluded Michel Aoun's FPM. See Raad, Nada, 'Opposition demands total Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon' in *The Daily Star*, 3 February 2005.

8. Blanford, Nicholas, *Killing Mr Lebanon: the Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, p. 152; 'L'espoir en lettres de sang, 14 février 2005–14 février 2006, la Révolution du Cèdre en marche', *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Special supplement), 13 February 2006, p. 107.
9. 'Battle of the airwaves', *The Economist*, 17 March 2005.
10. Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces in Lebanon and the disarmament of the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, was adopted on 2 September 2004. This came less than a week after Lahoud's presidency had been extended—a move opposed by Hariri although in 1995 he had obtained a similar prorogation for Lahoud's predecessor. (NB: Hariri strongly opposed the extension, but eventually instructed his parliamentary bloc to vote in favour of it.)
11. '"Record" protest held in Beirut', *BBC News*, 14 March 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4346613.stm. For a personal account, see Young, Michael, *The Ghosts of Martyrs Square. An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.
12. Abdel-Latif, Omeyma, 'Lebanon's Sunni Islamists-A Growing Force', Carnegie Papers, No. 6 (2008). See also International Crisis Group, 'Lebanon's Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri's Future Current', *Middle East Report*, No. 96, 26 May 2010.
13. See for example Shehadi, Nadim, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 'The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN on Trial?', Chatham House International Law Briefing Paper, July 2007; International Crisis Group, 'Trial by Fire: The Politics of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon', *Middle East Report*, No. 100, 2 December 2010.
14. In another twist of irony, Hariri's assassination took place exactly in front of the iconic St George Hotel, whose owners (mainly Fadi Khoury) fought a long battle of symbolic and judicial resistance to Hariri and his reconstruction agency Solidere.
15. The cleavage over Lebanon's (Arab) identity in 1958 may seem like an obvious reference to point at, but some authors have suggested similarities that go back even further. For example, Gary Bass lucidly recounts how, in 1860, France lobbied European powers to intervene in the region. Although Bass guards himself from making explicit links between the 1860 massacres in Lebanon and Syria and the events unfolding nearly a century and a half later, he carefully documents how political calculations resulted in an 'international commission of inquiry' being sent to the Levant in an attempt 'to stop the killings'. See Bass, Gary J., *Freedom's Battle. The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008. On the events of 1958, see Kerr, Malcolm, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals: 1958–1970*, London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

16. Volk, ibid., p. 199.
17. For more details, see Vloeberghs, Ward, 'Worshipping the Martyr President: the *darîh* of Rafiq al-Hariri in Beirut', in Pierret, Thomas, Badouin Dupret, Paulo G. Pinto and Kathryn Spellman-Poots (eds), *Ethnographies of Islam*, (forthcoming).
18. In reference to the Syriac word *mār*, meaning saint, which is often used for Christian saints such as Mar Charbel, Mar Taqla, Mar Maroun etc.
19. The Société libanaise de développement et de reconstruction (SOLIDERE) is a privately owned real estate company set up in 1994 to oversee the recovery of Beirut's city centre. Rafik Hariri was among its most influential promoters and owned a substantial part of its shares, which are listed on the Beirut stock exchange. See Vloeberghs, Ward, 'The Genesis of a Mosque: Negotiating Sacred Space in Downtown Beirut', *Working Paper*, (European University Institute, RSCAS 2008/17), esp. pp. 5–10.
20. During a round-table discussion with the late Samir Kassir, there was even talk of a Lebanese national 'pantheon'. See 'Le kiosque arabe', *Radio France Internationale (RFI)*, 8 April 2005.
21. 'Hariri: See How Beirut Presents a Model for Coexistence Between Christianity and Islam', *al-Liwā*, 20 October 2008.
22. For details on this project and Hariri's involvement, see Vloeberghs, ibid., pp. 2–5.
23. See Vloeberghs, Ward, 'A Building of Might and Faith. Rafik al-Hariri and the Muhammad al-Amin Mosque. On the Political Dimensions of Religious Architecture in Contemporary Beirut', PhD thesis in political science, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010.
24. Interview with Saad Khaled, former Director General of Urbanism and mediator in Hariri's negotiations with the Muhammad al-Amin Association, Beirut, 16 April 2009.
25. It is important to observe that several cathedrals—and mosques—stand in the vicinity of the Muhammad al-Amin mosque. In fact, almost all communities (except the Shia) have built a monumental place of worship in central Beirut over the past few centuries.
26. See 'Architectural design for Muhammad al-Amin mosque… won't see the light. New original work from architect Rasem Badran', *al-Liwā*, 1 November 2002. Five days after this publication, a ceremony took place at the construction site with Rafik Hariri and Mufti Qabbani laying the first stone.
27. Khalaf, Samir, *Heart of Beirut. Reclaiming the Bourj*, London: Saqi, 2006, p. 31.
28. See Khan, Riz, *Alwaleed. Businessman, Billionaire, Prince*, New York: William Morrow, 2005, p. 318; Blanford, ibid., p. 85; Mermier, Franck, 'La mosquée Muhammad al-Amîn à Beyrouth: mausolée involontaire de Rafic Hariri', *Revue d'études des mondes méditerranéen et musulmans* (REMMM), No. 125 (2009), pp. 177–96. Since al-Walid was also a business partner to Hariri on other occasions both before and after the former's contribution, the rivalry between both men should not be overstated. See: Vloeberghs, ibid., Chapter 4.
29. On these notions, see Traboulsi, Fawwaz, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, London: Pluto Press, 2007; El-Mufti, Karim, 'Reconstruction d'Etat dans les sociétés multicommunautaires: analyse comparative entre le Liban et la Bosnie-Herzégovine' (forthcoming). On Hariri's policies, see Denoeux, Guilain, and Robert Springborg, 'Hariri's Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant?', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1998), pp. 158–73. On Lahoud's role in the Lebanese Armed Forces, see Koekenbier, Pieter, 'A New Model Army? The Reconstruction of the Military in Post-war Lebanon', MA Thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2005.
30. Dellerba, Isabelle, 'Les combats du Barouk', unpublished article prepared for *Libération* in May 2008.
31. One may wonder whether this contributed as a distant precursor for the dramatic change that swept Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries throughout 2011.
32. Haugbolle, ibid., p. 62.
33. Khuri, Fuad I., *Imams and Emirs. State, Religion and Sects in Islam*, London: Saqi, 2006, p. 76.
34. Harb, Mona, 'La Dâhiye de Beyrouth: parcours d'une stigmatisation urbaine, consolidation d'un territoire politique', *Genèses*, No. 51 (2003), pp. 70–91; Harb, Mona, *Le Hezbollah à Beyrouth: de la banlieue à la ville*, Paris: Karthala, 2010.
35. Haugbolle, ibid., p. 74.
36. In 2011, the gathering was held on Sunday 13 March rather than on Monday 14, in order to allow for more participants. See for example 'March 13 sun keeps March 14 crowd energized', *The Daily Star*, 14 March 2011.
37. Such as: 'he taught, he built, he liberated' or 'the hand that built a fatherland'. The remembrance dynamic also extends to the media. In 2005, al-Arabiya produced a documentary emphatically titled 'Shahîd ad-dawla…dawlat ash-shahîd', (Martyr of the nation, His Excellency the martyr). Lebanese media broadcast advertisements such as: 'dammak ghālī, sawtna 'ālī' (your blood is expensive, our voice is loud).
38. In particular Saib Salam (a four-time prime minister who died in 2000 and hailed from a notable family of Beirut) was an important competitor for Hariri during the beginning of his political career. See Saqr, Yusuf, *'A'ilat hakamat lubnan*, (Families who governed Lebanon) Beirut: al-Markaz al-'Arabîlil-ma'alûmât, 2008; Johnson, Michael, *Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985*, London: Ithaca Press, 1986.
39. It should be noted that Rafik Hariri's sister Bahia, who became minister of education in 2008, has two sons who occupy important political posts. As soon as

the political succession was settled, the inevitable support in terms of images and narratives appeared. See for example Al-Bqaily, Nabil, *The Golden Book. Saad Rafic Hariri*, (in Arabic) Beirut: Chemaly Printing Press, 2005.

40. Volk, ibid., p. 188.
41. It is illustrative of the volatile nature of Lebanese politics that Najib Mikati (b. 1955) has been both a political rival and a political partner to the Hariris. Before his 2009 electoral alliance with Saad Hariri, Mikati had served under Rafik Hariri. Between 2000 and 2004 he was minister of public works and transportation, a position he had inherited from his participation in the preceding, anti-Hariri cabinet led by Salim al-Hoss (1998–2000).
42. Though Jumblatt himself had announced his departure from the 14 March coalition on 2 August 2009 his support for the Mikati-led government angered members within his own parliamentary bloc. For an historic overview of Jumblatt's political positioning, see Rowayheb, Marwan, 'Walid Jumblatt and Political Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation', *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2011), pp. 47–66.

10. 'HISTORY' AND 'MEMORY' IN LEBANON SINCE 2005: BLIND SPOTS, EMOTIONAL ARCHIVES AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES

1. Khalaf, Samir, *Beirut Reclaimed: Reflections on Urban Design and the Restoration of Civility*, Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1993; Barak, Oren, '"Don't Mention the War?" The Politics of Remembrance and Forgetfulness in Postwar Lebanon', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007), pp. 49–70; Choueiri, Youssef (ed.), *Breaking the Cycle: Civil Wars in Lebanon*, London: Stacey International, 2007; Volk, Lucia, *Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010; Haugbolle, Sune, *War and Memory in Lebanon*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
2. Choueiri, ibid.
3. Khatib, Lina, *Lebanese Cinema—Imagining the Civil War and Beyond*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2008.
4. Haugbolle, ibid., pp. 96–129.
5. Toukan, Hanan, 'On Being "The Other", in Post-Civil War Lebanon: Aid and the Politics of Art in Processes of Contemporary Cultural Production', *Arab Studies Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2010), pp. 118–62.
6. See http://www.nadasehnaoui.com/index.php.
7. Mroué, Rabih, *How Nancy Wished that it was all an April's Fool*, (DVD), Beirut: Ashkal Alwan, 2007.
8. See Quilty, Jim, 'Briefly banned play traces sects' political morphings', *The Daily Star*, 4 September 2007.
9. Haugbolle, ibid., pp. 79–82.

10. I refer to a DVD recording of a performance at the Monot Theatre in Beirut, October 2007. The DVD is produced for the Ashkal Alwan library.
11. Khatib, ibid.
12. Haugbolle, ibid., pp. 194–6.
13. Volk, ibid., pp. 154–88.
14. Lorenz, Chris, 'Can Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the "Metaphorical Turn"', *History and Theory*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1998), pp. 309–29.
15. Cooke, Miriam, *War's Other Voices: Women Writers in the Lebanese Civil War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
16. Saidawi, Rafif R., *Nadhra al-riwa'iya ila al-harb al-lubnaniya 1975–1995*, (The Narrative View on the Lebanese War 1975–1995) Beirut: Dar al-Farabi/Anep, 2003.
17. Williams, Raymond, *Politics and Letters—Interviews with New Left Review*, London: Verso, 1981.
18. Haugbolle, ibid., pp. 96–131.
19. Williams, ibid., p. 160.
20. Ibid., p. 159.
21. Lorenz, ibid.
22. Hedstrom, Margaret, 'Archives, Memory, and Interfaces with the Past', *Archival Science*, Vol. 2, No. 1–2 (2002), pp. 21–43.
23. Derrida, Jacques, *Archive Fever*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
24. http://www.umam-dr.org/aboutUs.php?location=aboutUs.
25. To which the author of this article contributed most of the photographs.
26. Maasri, Zeina, *Off the Wall—Political Posters of the Lebanese Civil War*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009.
27. Haugbolle, ibid., pp. 194–227.
28. Eddé, Carla, 'Les mémoires des acteurs de la guerre: le conflit revisité par ses protagonistes', in Mermier, Franck, and Christophe Varin (eds), *Mémoires de guerres au Liban*, Paris: Sinbad, 2010, pp. 25–46.
29. Ménargues, Alain, *Les secrets de la guerre du Liban: du coup d'état de Béchir Gémayel aux massacres des camps palestiniens*, Paris: Albin Michel, 2004.
30. For a thorough overview of the historiography of Sabra and Shatila, see Signoles, Aude, 'Sabra and Chatila', *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, 2008, http://www.massviolence.org/Sabra-and-Chatila?artpage=6–8.
31. Haugbolle, ibid., pp. 208–11.
32. Ibid., p. 211.
33. Hage, Ghassan, 'Religious Fundamentalism as a Political Strategy—the evolution of the Lebanese Forces' religious discourse during the Lebanese Civil War', *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1992), pp. 27–45.
34. Khalaf, Samir, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002; pp. 1–22.